With the arrival of modern internet era, large public networks of various types have come to existence to benefit the society as a whole and several research areas such as sociology, economics and geography in particular. However, the societal and research benefits of these networks have also given rise to potentially significant privacy issues in the sense that malicious entities may violate the privacy of the users of such a network by analyzing the network and deliberately using such privacy violations for deleterious purposes. Such considerations have given rise to a new active research area that deals with the quantification of privacy of users in large networks and the corresponding investigation of computational complexity issues of computing such quantified privacy measures. In this paper, we formalize three such privacy measures for large networks and provide non-trivial theoretical computational complexity results for computing these measures. Our results show the first two measures can be computed efficiently, whereas the third measure is provably hard to compute within a logarithmic approximation factor. Furthermore, we also provide computational complexity results for the case when the privacy requirement of the network is severely restricted, including an efficient logarithmic approximation.
Introduction
Social networks have certainly become an important center of attention in our modern information society by transforming human relationships into a huge interchange of, very often, sensitive data. There are many truly beneficial consequences when social network data are released for justified mining and analytical purposes. For example, researchers in sociology, economics and geography, as well as vendors in service-oriented systems and internet advertisers can certainly benefit and improve their performances by a fair study of the social network data. But, such benefits are definitely not free of cost as dishonest individuals or organizations may compromise the privacy of its users while scrutinizing a public social network and may deliberately use such privacy violations for harmful or other unfair commercial purposes. A common way to handle this kind of unwelcome intrusion on the user's privacy is to somehow anonymize the data by removing most potentially identifying attributes. However, even after such anonymization, often it may still be possible to infer many sensitive attributes of a social network that may be linked to its users, such as node degrees, inter-node distances or network connectivity, and therefore further privacy-preserving methods need to be investigated and analyzed. These additional privacy-preserving methods of social networks are based on the concept of k-anonymity introduced for microdata in [16] , aiming to ensure that no record in a database can be re-identified with a probability higher than 1 /k.
Crucial to modelling a social network anonymization process are of course the adversary's background knowledge of any object and the structural information about the network that is available. For example, assuming the involved social network as a simple graph in which individuals are represented by nodes and relationships between pairs of individuals are represented by edges, the adversary's background knowledge about a target (a node) could be the node degree [12] , the node neighborhood [23] , etc. In such scenarios, it frequently suffices to develop attacks to re-identify the individuals and their relationships. Such attacks are usually called passive (see [14] for more information). Some examples of passive attacks and the corresponding privacy-preserving methods for social networks can be found in references [12, 23, 24] .
In contrast, Backstrom et al. introduced the concept of the so-called active attacks in [1] . Such attacks are mainly based on creating and inserting in a network some nodes (the "attacker nodes") under control by the adversary. These attacker nodes could be newly created accounts with pseudonymous or spoofed identities (commonly called Sybil nodes), or existing legitimate individuals in the network which are in the adversary's proximity. The goal is then to establish links with some other nodes in the network (or even links between other nodes) in order to create some sort of "fingerprints" in the network that will be further released. Clearly, once the releasing action has been achieved, the adversary could retrieve the fingerprints already introduced, and use them to re-identify other nodes in the network. Backstrom et al. in [1] showed that O( √ log n) attacker nodes in a network could in fact seriously compromise the privacy of any arbitrary node. In recent years, several research works have appeared that deal with decreasing the impact of these active attacks (see, for instance, [20] ). For other related publications on privacy-preserving methods in social networks, see [15, 21, 23] .
There are already many well-known active attack strategies for social networks in order to find all possible vulnerabilities. However, somewhat surprisingly, not many prior research works have addressed the goal of measuring how resistant is a given social network against these kinds of active attacks to the privacy. To this effect, very recently a novel privacy measure for social networks was introduced in [18] . The privacy measure proposed there was called the (k, ℓ)-anonymity, where k is a number indicating a privacy threshold and ℓ is the maximum number of attacker nodes that can be inserted into the network; ℓ may be estimated through some statistical methods 1 . TrujilloRasua and Yero in [18] showed that graphs satisfying (k, ℓ)-anonymity can prevent adversaries who control at most ℓ nodes in the network from re-identifying individuals with probability higher than 1 /k. This privacy measure relies on a graph parameter called the k-metric anti-dimension.
Consider a simple connected unweighted graph G = (V, E) and let dist u,v be the length (number of edges) of a shortest path between two nodes u, v ∈ V . For an ordered sequence S = u 1 , . . . , u t of nodes of G and a node v ∈ V , the vector d v,−S = (dist v,u 1 , . . . , dist v,ut ) is called the metric representation of v with respect to S. Based on the above definition, a set S ⊂ V of nodes is called a k-anti-resolving set for G if k is the largest positive integer such that for every node v ∈ V \S there exist at least k
i.e., v and v 1 , . . . , v k−1 have the same metric representation with respect to S. The k-metric antidimension of G, denoted by adim k (G), is then the minimum cardinality of any k-anti-resolving set in G. Note that k-anti-resolving sets may not exist in a graph for every k.
The connection between (k, ℓ)-anonymity privacy measure and the k-metric anti-dimension can be understood in the following way. Suppose that an adversary takes control of a set of nodes S of the graph (i.e., S plays the role of attacker nodes), and the background knowledge of such an adversary regarding a target node v is the metric representation of the node v with respect to S. The (k, ℓ)-anonymity privacy measure is then a privacy metric that naturally evolves from the adversary's background knowledge. Intuitively, if S (the attacker nodes of an adversary) is a k-anti-resolving set then the adversary cannot uniquely re-identify other nodes in the network (based on the metric representation) from these attacker nodes with a probability higher than 1 /k (based on uniform sampling of other nodes), and if the k-metric anti-dimension of the graph is ℓ then the adversary must use at least ℓ attacker nodes to get the probability of privacy violation down to 1 /k.
Other Privacy Concepts and Measures
There is a rich literature on theoretical investigations of privacy measures and privacy preserving computational models in several other application areas such as multi-party communications, distributed computing and game-theoretic settings (e.g., see [2, 3, 8, 11, 22] ). However, none of these settings apply directly to our application scenario of active attack model for social networks. The differential privacy model, introduced by Dwork [5] in the context of privacy preservation in statistical databases against malicious database queries, works by computing the correct answer to a query and adding a noise drawn from a specific distribution, and is quite different from the anonymization approach studied in this paper.
Organization of the Paper
It is obviously desirable to know how secure a given social network is against active attacks. This necessitates the study of computational complexity issues for computing (k, ℓ)-anonymity. Currently known results only include some heuristic algorithms with no provable guarantee on performances such as in [18] , or algorithms for very special cases. In fact, it is not even known if any version of the related computational problems is NP-hard. To this effect, we formalize three computational problems related to measuring the (k, ℓ)-anonymity of graphs and present non-trivial computational complexity results for these problems. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
⊲ In Section 2 we review some basic terminologies and notations and then present the three computational problems that we consider in this paper. For the benefit of the reader, we also briefly review some standard algorithmic complexity concepts and results that will be used later.
⊲ In Section 3, we state the results in this paper mathematically precisely along with some informal remarks. We group our results based on the problem definitions and the expected size of the attacker nodes.
⊲ Sections 4-6 are devoted to the proofs of the results stated in Section 3.
⊲ We finally conclude in Section 7 with some possible future research directions.
Basic Terminologies, Notations and Problem Definitions
In this section, we first describe the terminologies and notations required to describe our computational problems, and subsequently describe several versions of the problems we consider. Let G = (V, E) be our undirected unweighted input graph over n nodes v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n . We use dist v i ,v j to denote the distance (number of edges in a shortest path) between nodes v i and v j . For illustrating various notations, we use the example in Fig. 1 .
Basic Terminologies and Notations
is the diameter (length of a longest shortest path) of the graph (2, 1) . ⊲ For every node v i ∈ ∪ k t=1 V t \ ∪ ℓ t=1 V t , remove v i from the set containing it in Π. ⊲ Optionally, for every set V ℓ in Π, replace V ℓ by a partition of V ℓ . ⊲ Remove empty sets, if any.
◮ The equality relation over a set of vectors, all of same length, obviously defines an equivalence relation. The following notations are used for such an equivalence relation over the set of vectors
⊲ The set of equivalence classes, which forms a partition of
⊲ Abusing terminologies slightly, two nodes v i , v j ∈ V \ V ′ will be said to belong to the same equivalence class if
⊲ The measure of the equivalence relation is defined as µ
Thus, if a set S is a k-anti-resolving set then D V \S,−S defines a partition into equivalence classes whose measure is exactly k. 
Problem Definitions
It is obviously desirable to know how secure a given social network is against active attacks. This necessitates the study of computational complexity issues for computing (k, ℓ)-anonymity. To this effect, we formalize three computational problems related to measuring the (k, ℓ)-anonymity of graphs For all the problem versions, let G = (V, E) be the (connected undirected unweighted) input graph representing the social network under study.
Notation related to Problem 1 k opt = max
Problem 1 simply finds a k-anti-resolving set for the largest possible k. Intuitively, it sets an absolute bound on the privacy violation probability of an adversary assuming that the adversary can use any number of attacker nodes. In practice, however, the number of attacker nodes employed by the adversary may be limited, which leads us to the second problem formulation stated below.
Problem 2 (k ≥ -metric anti-dimension or Adim ≥k ) Given G and a positive integer k, find a subset of nodes V ′ of minimum cardinality such that µ D V \V ′ ,−V ′ ≥ k, if such a V ′ exists.
Notation and assumption related to Problem 2 L
Problem 2 finds a k-anti-resolving set for largest k while simultaneously minimizing the number of attacker nodes.
The remaining third version of our problem formulation relates to a trade-off between privacy violation probability and the corresponding minimum number of attacker nodes needed to achieve such a violation. To understand this motivation, suppose that G has a k-metric anti-dimension of ℓ, a k ′ -metric anti-dimension of ℓ ′ , k ′ > k and ℓ ′ < ℓ. Then, this provides a trade-off between privacy and number of attacker nodes, namely we may allow a smaller privacy violation probability 1 /k ′ but the network can tolerate adversarial control of a fewer number ℓ ′ of nodes or we may allow a larger privacy violation probability 1 /k but the network can tolerate adversarial control of a larger number ℓ of nodes. Such a trade-off may be crucial for a network administrator in administering privacy of a network or for an individual in its decision to join a network. Clearly, this necessitates solving a problem of the following type.
Problem 3 (k = -metric antidimension or Adim =k ) Given G and a positive integer k, find a subset of nodes
Notation and assumption related to Problem 3 L
=k opt = V =k opt = min |V ′ | µ D V \V ′ ,−V ′ = k for some ∅ ⊂ V =k opt ⊂ V . If µ D V \V ′ ,−V ′ = k for no V ′ then we set L =k opt = ∞ and V =k opt = ∅
Standard Algorithmic Complexity Concepts and Results
For the benefit of the reader, we summarize the following concepts and results from the computational complexity theory domain. We assume that the reader is familiar with standard O, Ω, o and ω notations used in asymptotic analysis of algorithms (e.g., see [4] ). An algorithm A for a minimization (resp., maximization) problem is said to have an approximation ratio of ε (or is simply an ε-approximation) [19] provided A runs in polynomial time in the size of its input and produces a solution with an objective value no larger than ε times (resp., no smaller than 1 /ε times) the value of the optimum. DTIME n log log n refers to the class of problem that can be solved by a deterministic algorithm running in (n log log n ) time when n is the size of the input instance; it is widely believed that NP ⊂DTIME(n log log n ).
The minimum set-cover problem (Sc) is a well-known combinatorial problem that is defined as follows [4, 9] . Our input is an universe U = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n } of n elements, and a collection of m sets S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m ⊆ U over this universe with ∪ m j=1 S j = U . A valid solution of Sc is a subset of indices I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , m} such that every element in U is "covered" by a set whose index is in I, i.e., ∀ a j ∈ U ∃ i ∈ I : a j ∈ S i . The objective of Sc is to minimize the number |I| of selected sets. We use the notation opt Sc to denote the size (number of sets) in an optimal solution of an instance of Sc. On the inapproximability side, Sc is NP-hard [9] and, assuming N P ⊆ DTIME n log log n , Sc does not admit a (1 − ε) ln n-approximation for any constant 0 < ε < 1 [7] . On the algorithmic side, Sc admits a (1 + ln n)-approximation using a simple greedy algorithm [10] that can be easily implemented to run in O m i=1 |S i | time [4] .
Our Results
In this section we provide precise statements of our results, leaving their proofs in Sections 4-6.
Polynomial Time Solvability of Adim and Adim ≥k
Theorem 1 (a) Both Adim and Adim ≥k can be solved in O n 4 time.
(b) Both Adim and Adim ≥k can also be solved in O n 4 log n k time "with high probability" (i.e., with a probability of at least 1 − n −c for some constant c > 0).
Remark 1
The randomized algorithm in Theorem 1(b) runs faster that the deterministic algorithm in Theorem 1(a) provided k = ω(log n).
Computational Complexity of Adim =k

The Case of Arbitrary k
Theorem 2 (a) Adim =k is NP-complete for any integer k in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ n ε where 0 ≤ ε < 1 2 is any arbitrary constant, even if the diameter of the input graph is 2.
(b) Assuming NP ⊆ DTIME (n log log n ), there exists a universal constant δ > 0 such that Adim =k does not admit a 1 δ ln n -approximation for any integer k in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ n ε where 0 ≤ ε < Remark 2 (a) For k = 1, the inapproximability ratio in Theorem 2(a) is asymptotically optimal up to a constant factor because of the (1 + ln(n − 1))-approximation of Adim =1 in Theorem 3(a).
(b) The result in Theorem 2(b) provides a much stronger inapproximability result compared to that in Theorem 2(a) at the expense of a slightly weaker complexity-theoretic assumption (i.e., NP ⊆ DTIME (n log log n ) vs. P = NP).
The Case of k = 1
Note that even when k = 1 Adim =k is NP-hard and even hard to approximate within a logarithmic factor due to Theorem 2. We show the following algorithmic results for Adim =k when k = 1.
(b) If G has at least one node of degree 1 then L =1 opt = 1 and thus Adim =1 can be solved in O n 3 time.
(c) If G does not contain a cycle of 4 edges then L =1 opt ≤ 2 and thus Adim =1 can be solved in O n 3 time.
Proof of Theorem 1
(a) We first consider the claim for Adim ≥k . We begin by proving some structural properties of valid solutions for Adim ≥k . Proof. Since v i and v j are not in the same equivalence class in Π =
Proposition 1 Consider two subsets of nodes
The following proposition gives some condition for this to happen.
Proposition 2 Consider two subsets of nodes
and thus the following implications hold:
contains an equivalence class (subset of nodes)
❑ Based on the above structural properties, we design Algorithm I for Adim ≥k as shown below.
Algorithm I: O n 4 time deterministic algorithm for Adim ≥k .
Compute
. . , V ℓ be the only ℓ > 0 equivalence classes (subsets of nodes) 
Let {v ℓ } = V 1 ⊂ V 2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ V κ be the κ subsets of nodes that were assigned to V ′ in successive iterations of the while loop in Step 3.2. We have the following cases to consider.
Case 2: V ≥k opt = V t for any t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , κ}. Since V 1 = {v ℓ } ⊂ V ≥k opt and V t = V ≥k opt for any t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , κ}, only one of the following cases is possible: • By Step 3.2.5, 
Thus, it follows that the total time to execute all iterations of the while loop for a specific choice of v i in Step 3 is of the order of n times the time taken to solve a problem of the following kind:
by Corollary 4, we can use the following simple strategy. For every set S ∈ Π = V \V ′ ,−V ′ , we split S \ {v j } = {v i 1 , v i 2 , . . . , v is } into two or more parts, if needed, by doing a bucket-sort (with n bins) in O(n |S|) time on the sequence of values dist
The total time taken for all sets in Π = V \V ′ ,−V ′ is thus
This completes the proof for Adim ≥k . Now we consider the claim for Adim. Obviously, Adim can be solved in O n 5 time by solving Adim ≥k for k = n−1, n−2, . . . , 1 in this order and selecting the largest k as k opt for which L 
. . , V ℓ be the only ℓ > 0 equivalence classes (subsets of nodes)
. return k opt and V ≥k opt as our solution
The proof of correctness is very similar (and, in fact simpler due to elimination of some cases) to that of Adim ≥k . 
return the best of all solutions found in Step 3
The success probability p is given by 
Proof of Theorem 2
(a) Adim =k trivially belongs to NP for any k, thus we need to show that it is also NP-hard.
The standard NP-complete minimum dominating set (Mds) problem for a graph is defined as follows [9] . Our input is a connected undirected unweighted graph G = (V, E). A subset of nodes V ′ ⊂ V is called a dominating set if and only if every node in V \ V ′ is adjacent to some node in V ′ . The objective of Mds is to find a dominating set of nodes of minimum cardinality. Let ν(G) denote the cardinality of a minimum dominating set for a graph G. It is well-known that the Mds and Sc problems have precisely the same approximability via approximation-preserving reductions in both directions and, in particular, there exists a standard reduction from Sc to Mds as follows. Given an instance U = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n } and S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m ⊆ U of Sc, we create the following instance G 1 = (V 1 , E 1 ) of Mds. V 1 has an element node v a i for every element a i ∈ U and a set node v S j for every set S j with j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}. There are two types of edges in E 1 . Every set node v S j has an edge to every other set node v S ℓ and the collection of these edges is called the set of clique edges. Moreover, a set node v S j is connected to an element node v a i if and only if a i ∈ S j and the collection of these edges is called the set of membership edges. A standard straightforward argument shows that I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , m} is a solution of Sc if and only if the collection of set nodes { v S i | i ∈ I } is a solution of Mds on G 1 and thus opt Sc = ν (G 1 ).
For the purpose of our NP-hardness reduction, it would be more convenient to work with a restricted version of Sc known as the exact cover by 3-sets (X3c) problem. Here we have exactly n elements and exactly n sets where n is a multiple of three, every set contains exactly 3 elements and every element occurs in exactly 3 sets. Obviously we need at least n 3 sets to cover all the n elements. Letting opt X3c to denote the number of sets in an optimal solution of X3c, it is well-known that problem of deciding whether opt X3c = n 3 is in fact NP-complete.
be the real-valued solution of the quadratic equation n 1 2k + 2n 1 3 + k = n. Note that since k ≤ n ε for some constant ε < 1 2 , we have n 1 = Θ ( √ n ), i.e., n and n 1 are "polynomially related". We assume without loss of generality that n 1 is an even integer, and start with an instance of X3c of n 1 2 elements and transform it to an instance graph G 1 = (V 1 , E 1 ) having n 1 nodes of Mds via the reduction outlined before. Since n 1 2 is polynomially related to n, such an instance of X3c is NP-complete with respect to n being the input size. We reduce G 1 to an instance G = (V, E) of Adim =k in polynomial time as follows (see Fig. 2 for an illustration):
• We "clone" each element node v a j ∈ V 1 to get 2k+ 2n 1 3 copies, i.e., every node v a j is replaced by 2k+
,. We refer to these nodes as clones of the element node v a j (or, sometimes simply as element-clone nodes). There are precisely n 1 k + n 1 3 such nodes.
• We "clone" each set node v S j ∈ V 1 to get 2k + 2n 1 3 copies, i.e., every node v S j is replaced by 2k +
,. We refer to these nodes as clones of the set node v S j (or, sometimes simply as set-clone nodes). There are precisely n 1 k + n 1 3 such nodes.
• We add k new nodes u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u k . We refer to these nodes as clique nodes.
• We add an edge between every pair of clique nodes u i and u j . We refer to these edges as clique edges. There are precisely k 2 such edges.
• We add an edge between every clique node and every non-clique node, i.e., we add every edge in the set
X3c
Mds Figure 2 : Illustration of the NP-hardness reduction in Theorem 2(a). Only a part of the graph G is shown for visual clarity.
We refer to these edges as the partition-fixing edges. There are precisely kn 1 k + n 1 3 such edges.
• We add an edge between every pair of distinct element-clone nodes v a j ,ℓ and v a j ′ ,ℓ ′ . We refer to these as the element-clone edges. There are precisely
such edges.
• For every element a i and every set S j such that a i / ∈ S j , we add the following 2k + v S j ,ℓ , v a i ,p for 1 ≤ ℓ, p ≤ 2k + 2n 1 3 We refer to these edges as the non-member edges corresponding to the element node a i and the set node S j . There are precisely Note that G has precisely n 1 2k +
+ k = n nodes and thus our reduction is polynomial time in n. Since any clique node is adjacent to every other node in G, it follows that diam(G) = 2. We now show the validity of our reduction by showing that
Consider an optimal solution
3 . We claim that V ′ is a valid solution of Adim =k by showing that
To prove (a), consider a clique node u i and any other non-clique node. Then, the following cases apply:
• Suppose that the non-clique node is a element-clone node v a j ,ℓ ∈ V \ V ′ for some j and ℓ.
Since V ′ 1 is a solution of Mds on G 1 , there exists a set node v Sp ∈ V ′ 1 such that v Sp , v a j ∈ E 1 and consequently v Sp,1 , v a j ,ℓ / ∈ E. This implies that there exists a node v Sp,1 ∈ V ′ such that 1 = dist u i ,v a j ,ℓ = dist v Sp,1 ,v a j ,ℓ , and therefore v a j ,ℓ cannot be in the same equivalence class with u i .
• Suppose that the non-clique node is a set-clone node v S j ,p ∈ V \ V ′ . Pick any set-clone node
, and therefore v S j ,p cannot be in the same equivalence class with u i .
To prove (b), note the following:
• Since diam(G) = 2, dist v S i ,p ,v S j ,q = 2 for any two distinct set-clone nodes v S i ,p and v S j ,q , and thus all the set nodes in V \ V ′ belong together in the same equivalence class in Π = V \V ′ ,−V ′ . There are at least n 1 k +
3 > k such nodes in V \ V ′ . Thus, any equivalence class that contains these set-clone nodes cannot have less than k nodes.
• Consider now an equivalence class in Π = V \V ′ ,−V ′ that contains a copy v a i ,j of the element node v a i for some i and j. Consider another copy v a i ,ℓ of the element node v a i for some ℓ = j.
Thus, any equivalence class that contains at least one clone of an element node must contain all the 2k + 2n 1 3 > k clones of that element node and thus such an equivalence class cannot have a number of nodes that is less than k.
Since we know that ν (G 1 ) is always at least
3 . Since V =k opt is a solution of Adim =k on G, there exists a subset of nodes, say
Proposition 3 V does not contain any set-clone or element-clone nodes and thus V = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u k }.
Proof. Suppose that V contains at least one element-clone node v a i ,j for some i and j. But, V \V =k opt contains at least 2k +
3 − 1 > k other clones of the element node a i and all these clones must belong together with v a i ,j in the same equivalence class. This implies | V | ≥ 2k +
Similarly, suppose that V contains at least one set-clone node v S i ,j for some i and j. But, V \ V =k opt contains at least 2k + Proof. Suppose that V =k opt contains two set-clone nodes v S j ,p and v S j ,q of the same set node v S j . But, V \V =k opt contains at least 2k +
3 −1 > k other clones of the element node a i and all these clones must belong together in the same equivalence class S. If we remove v S j ,p from V =k opt then v S j ,p gets added to this equivalence class. Thus, such a removal produced another valid solution but with one node less than L opt , contradicting the optimality of L =k opt . ❑ Proposition 5 V =k opt does not contain any element-clone node.
Proof. Suppose that V =k opt contains at least one element-clone node and thus at most
3 clones of every element node a i . Consider an element-clone node v a i ,p ∈ V \ V =k opt and a clique node u j . Since
, there must be a node in V =k opt such that the distance of this node to u j is different from the distance to v a i ,p . Such a node in V =k opt cannot be an element-clone node, say v a ℓ ,q since dist va i ,p,va ℓ ,q = dist u j ,va ℓ ,q = 1. Since there is an edge between every set-clone node and every clique node, such a node must be a set-clone node, say v Sr,s for some r and s, such that dist va i ,p,vS r ,s = 2, i.e., a i ∈ S r . Since every set in X3c contains exactly 3 elements and 3 × n 1 3 − 1 < n 1 , there must then exist an element-clone node v a i ,p such that the distance of v a i ,p to any node in V =k opt is exactly the same as the distance of u j to that node in V =k opt . This implies v a i ,p ∈ V , contradicting Proposition 3. ❑ By Proposition 4 and Proposition 5, V =k opt contains exactly one clone of a subset of set nodes. Without loss of generality, assume that
We are now ready to finish our proof by showing V ′ 1 is indeed a valid solution of Mds on G 1 . Suppose not, and let v a i be an element-node that is not adjacent to any node in V ′ 1 . Then,
which contradicts Proposition 3.
(b) The proof is similar to that of (a) but this time we start with a general version of Sc as opposed to the restricted X3c version, and show that the reduction is approximation-preserving in an appropriate sense. In the sequel, we use the standard notation poly(n) to denote a polynomial n c of n (for some constant c > 0). We recall the following details of the inapproximability reduction of Feige in [7] . Given an instance formula φ of the standard Boolean satisfiability problem (Sat), Feige reduces φ to an instance U , S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m of Sc (with m = poly(n)) in O(n log log n ) time such that the following properties are satisfied for any constant 0 < ε < 1:
• The reduction satisfies the following completeness and soundness properties:
Since m = poly(n), by adding duplicate copies of a set, if necessary, we can ensure that m = n c − n for some constant c ≥ 1. Our reduction from Sc to Mds to Adim =k is same as in (a) except that some details are different, which we show here.
• We start with an instance of Sc as given by Feige in [7] with n 1 elements and m = (n 1 ) c − n 1 sets,
where
is a real-valued solution of the equation (n 1 ) 2c +k(n 1 ) c − n−k 2 = 0. Note that since k ≤ n ε for some constant ε < 1 2 , we have n 1 = Θ n 1/(2 c) , i.e., n and n 1 are polynomially related.
• We make 2(n 1 ) c + 2k copies of each element node and each set node as opposed to 2k + 2n 1 3 copies that we made in the proof of (a). Note that G has again precisely (n 1 ) c (2k + 2(n 1 ) c ) + k = n nodes.
• Let δ > 0 be the constant given by δ = ln n (1−ε) ln n 1 . Our claim (⋆) in the proof of (a) is now modified to
• Our proof of the completeness claim follows the "Proof of ν (
3 " in the proof of (a) with the obvious replacement of • Note that our soundness claim is equivalent to its contra-positive
and the proof of this contra-positive follows the "Proof of
3 " in the proof of (a). In the proof, the quantity 2k + 2n 1 3 corresponding to the number of copies for each set and element node needs to be replaced by 2(n 1 ) c + 2k; note that (2(n 1 ) c + 2k) − n 1 ≫ k. 
Proof of Theorem 3
(a) Note that trivially L =1 opt ≤ n − 1 and thus V =1 opt = ∅. Our algorithm, shown as Algorithm V, uses the greedy logarithmic approximation of Johnson [10] for Sc that selects, at each successive step, a set that contains the maximum number of elements that are still not covered.
Algorithm V: O n 3 -time (1 + ln(n − 1) )-approximation algorithm for Adim =1 . Compute d i for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n in O n 3 time using Floyd-Warshall algorithm.
1.
L
3.1 create the following instance of Sc containing n − 1 elements and n − 1 sets:
1 run the greedy approximation algorithm [10] for this instance of Sc giving a solution I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i}
opt and V =1 opt as our solution Lemma 7 (Proof of correctness) Algorithm V returns a valid solution for Adim =1 .
Proof. Suppose that our algorithm returns an invalid solution in the iteration of the for loop in Step 3 when v i is equal to v ℓ for some v ℓ ∈ V . We claim that this cannot be the case since {v ℓ } ∈ Π = V \V ′ ,−V ′ . Indeed, since I is a valid solution of the Sc instance, for every j / ∈ {ℓ} ∪ I, the following holds:
and thus v ℓ cannot be together with any other node in any equivalence class in Π = V \V ′ ,−V ′ . ❑ Lemma 8 (Proof of approximation bound) Algorithm V solves Adim =1 with an approximation ratio of 1 + ln(n − 1).
Consider the iteration of the for loop in Step 3 when v i is equal to v ℓ . We now analyze the run of this particular iteration, and claim that the set-cover instance created during this iteration satisfies opt Sc ≤ V =1 opt = L =1 opt . To see this, construct the following solution of the set-cover instance from V opt containing exactly L opt sets:
To see that this is indeed a valid solution of the set-cover instance, consider any a v j ∈ U = {a v 1 , a v 2 , . . . , a vn } \ {a v ℓ }. Then, the following cases apply showing that a v j belongs to some set selected in our solution of Sc:
• if j ∈ I then a v j ∈ S v j and S v j is a selected set in the solution.
• if j / ∈ I then v j ∈ V \ V opt ⇒ ∃ v t ∈ V opt : dist v ℓ ,vt = dist v j ,vt ⇒ ∃ t ∈ I : a v j ∈ S vt .
Using the approximation bound of the algorithm of [10] it now follows that the quality of our solution L =1 opt satisfies L =1 opt = V =1 opt = |I| < (1 + ln(n − 1) )opt Sc ≤ (1 + ln(n − 1) )L =1 opt ❑ Lemma 9 (Proof of time complexity) Algorithm V runs in O n 3 time.
Proof. There are a total of n instances of set cover that we need to build in Step 3.1 and solve by the greedy heuristic in Step 3.2.1. Building the set-cover instance can be trivially done in O n 2 time by comparing dist v i ,v j for all appropriate pairs of nodes v i and v j . Since the set-cover instance in Step 3.1 has n − 1 sets each having no more than n − 1 elements, each implementation of the greedy heuristic in (c) Since G does not contain a 4-cycle, diam(G) ≥ 2. Thus, there exists two nodes v i , v j ∈ V such that dist v i ,v j = 2. Let v ℓ be a node at a distance of 1 from both v i and v j on a shortest path between v i and v j (see Fig. 3 ). Consider the following solution of Adim =1 : V ′ = {v i , v j }. Note that v ℓ ∈ V \ V ′ . We claim that this is a valid solution of Adim =1 by showing that {v ℓ } ∈ Π = V \V ′ ,−V ′ (i.e., no node v p ∈ V \ {v i , v j , v ℓ } can belong together with v ℓ in the same equivalence class of Π = V \V ′ ,−V ′ ) in the following manner:
• If v p ∈ Nbr (v i ) \ {v ℓ } then dist v ℓ ,v j = 1 but dist vp,v j = 1 since G has no 4-cycle (see the edges marked × × × in Fig. 3 ).
• If v p ∈ Nbr (v j ) \ {v ℓ } then dist v ℓ ,v i = 1 but dist vp,v i = 1 since G has no 4-cycle (see the edges marked × × × in Fig. 3 ).
• If v p ∈ Nbr (v ℓ ) \ {v i , v j } then v p cannot be adjacent to both v i and v j since G does not contain a 4-cycle. This implies that dist v ℓ ,v i = dist v ℓ ,v j = 1 but at least one of dist vp,v i and dist vp,v j is not equal to 1.
• If v p is any node not covered by the above cases, then dist vp,v i > 1 but dist v ℓ ,v i = 1.
Concluding Remarks
Prior to our work, known results for these privacy measures only included some heuristic algorithms with no provable guarantee on performances such as in [18] , or algorithms for very special cases. In fact, it was not even known if any version of these related computational problems is NP-hard.
Our work provides the first non-trivial computational complexity results for effective computation of these measures. Theorem 1 shows that both Adim and Adim ≥k are provably computationally easier problems than Adim =k . In contrast, Theorem 2(a)-(b) and Theorem 3 show that Adim =k is in general computationally hard but admits approximations or exact solution for specific choices of k or graph topology. We believe that our results will stimulate further research on quantifying and computing privacy measures for networks. In particular, our results raise the following interesting research questions:
◮ We have only provided a logarithmic approximation algorithm for Adim =1 . Is it possible to design a non-trivial approximation algorithm for Adim =k for k > 1 ? We conjecture that a O(log n)-approximation is possible for Adim =k for every fixed k.
◮ We have provided a logarithmic inapproximability result for Adim =k for every k roughly up to √ n. Can this approximability result be further improved when k is not a constant ?
We conjecture that the inapproximability factor can be further improved to Ω (n ε ) for some constant 0 < ε < 1 when k is around √ n.
